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Amongthe significant economic effects attendant upon the working of ex-
change control regimes are those that relate to illegal transactions. Since we
have defined exchange control regimes comprehensively to include those
foreign trade regimes that have a large complement of price instruments as
well as quantitative restrictions, we need to distinguish between the price and
quantitative instruments in discussing the emergence of illegal transactions.
The use of QRs is not, of course, a necessary condition for such illegal
transactions since tariffs can equally create an incentive for smuggling and
faked invoicing. In the analysis that follows we therefore plan to note also the
distinctive aspects of QRs in regard to the growth of illegal transactions.
These illegal phenomena can be divided into three broad classes: (1) those
that relate to abuses in awarding, claiming, and disposing of licenses; (2) those
pertaining to illegal trade transactions such as smuggling and faked invoicing;
and (3) those relating to capital flows, including both capital flight abroad and
inward flows seeking better exchange rates in the black market. We consider
these now in turn. Finally, we turn to examining reverse links between illegal
transactions and exchange control rules and methods.
I. ILLEGALITY IN AWARDING, CLAIMING, AND DISPOSING OF
LICENSES
The most notable instances of illegality in awarding licenses have naturally ap-
peared in regard to import control.
1. We have noted in Chapter 2 how, in several import regimes, the bu-
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reaucrats generally sought to follow fair-share rules in their choice of criteria
for awarding licenses among competing claimants and that this phenomenon
was partly attributable to their desire to protect themselves against allegations
of corruption and favoritism. However, breakdowns in the actual honesty and
integrity of the bureaucracy dealing with the award of licenses were not un-
common.' Perhaps the most notable and extreme example of illegal manipula-
tion of allocational criteria in import licensing is provided by Ghanaian ex-
perience. Leith notes that the extensive, personalized routing of import
licenses by Mr. Djin, Minister of Trade in the Nkrumah cabinet from late
1963, resulted in "fraudulent exploitation, corruption and malpractices" ac-
cording to the investigative commission after the overthrow of the Nkrumah
regime. The displacement of Mr. Djin by President Nkrumah was to be ironic.
As Leith writes.2
In the first half of 1965 a number of steps were taken in an attempt to reverse
the situation created by Mr. Djin. President Nkrumah replaced Mr. Djin by Mr.
Kwesi Armah as Minister of Foreign Trade. ... Inaddition, a foreign-exchange
budget was published for the first time. The only significant result of these moves
was a more systematic form of corruption. Mr. Armah, rather than restricting
himself to profiting on some licenses, proceeded to develop a system that would
permit him to share in the profit on all licenses. As the post-Nkrumah commission
reported: "He [Mr. Armah] introduced the system whereby all applications for
import licenses had to be addressed to him personally under registered cover and
he alone was responsible for processing the said applications... [TIhere was open
corruption and malpractices in the matter of grant of import licenses during this
period. Import licenses were issued on the basis of a commission corruptly
demanded and payable by importers on the face value of the import licenses
issued. The commission was fixed at 10%, but was in special cases reduced to 7½
or 5%."
Political scientists have observed that the Ghanaian political system had been
characterized by subordination to the goal of economic profit to its par-
ticipants as distinct from any general ideology. Hence, even when we have
allowed for the customary postcoup exaggerations, it remains basically plausi-
ble that the import control regime was subject to serious abuse during the
ministries of Messrs. Djin and Armah.
2. There was illegality also in the claiming of import licenses, given the
criteria. Thus, in India, the Estimates Committee of the Indian Parliament
cited as an abuse of the import control system the following (among several)
practices:
(i) applying for licenses on the basis of forged essentiality certificates of the
Director of Industries or certificates obtained by misrepresentation;FAKED IN VOICING AND SMUGGLING 67
(ii) applying for licenses on the basis of forged quota certificates or such cer-
tificates obtained by false or forged documents of past imports;
(iii) applying for licenses on the basis of false turnover by producing cer-
tificates from a Chartered Accountant obtained by misrepresentation or in collu-
sion with the Chartered Accountant; and
(iv) applying for licenses on the basis of imports or exports which do not
qualify for establishment of quota.3
In Turkey, Anne Krueger records that since new firms in an industry were
to be given a quota initially on criteria rather different from established pro-
ducers, there were reported to be many instances of entrepreneurs 'going into
business' for the purpose of obtaining imports and reselling to larger firms.4
3. Finally, there was the illegality involved in the resale of the licenses or
the imports themselves in the regimes that prohibited such transferability. For
Turkey Anne Krueger has noted that, while industrialists could not legally
resell their imports, resale occurred in many ways. As some of the smaller
firms found it more profitable to sell their imports to larger firms than to pro-
duce themselves, a legal means of resale (resulting, however, in defacto illegal
transfer of imported goods) was for a small producer to ask a large producer
to place his order with the larger establishment's. The ostensible purpose of
permitting this practice was to enable the small producer to get a better price
on his import order than was thought possible with a very small allocation.
When the consignment arrived, however, the small firm could claim that the
larger house had violated their understanding. The consignment in quality,
technical specifications, or other regards was not what the small firm required
or could use. The larger firm would then settle the matter by paying off the
smaller firm for its goods and keeping the imports for its own use, all this at
the appropriate premium-inclusive price. Several other means of resale were
also devised, including even reported instances where the local chambers
organized resale markets.5
II. FAKED IN VOICING AND SMUGGLING
Both QRs and tariffs set up incentives to smuggle goods through illegal chan-
nels and to fake invoices on trade through legal channels. In either case, the il-
legal transaction yields profit. With QRs, for example, the premium on c.i.f.
value of imports may be high enough to cover both the risk on smuggling or
underinvoicing of imports6 and the premium on the foreign exchange with
which to pay the exporter. With tariffs, the same argument applies, except that
the tariff rate must be considered in place of the import premium.7 The argu-
ment applies equally, mutatis mutandis, to export smuggling and to faking of
invoices pertaining to exports.68 ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL
Note that, while the argument is equally applicable to QRs and tariffs, a
QR system is more likely to generate the phenomenon of illegal trade, either
smuggled or via faking of invoices, simply because QRs tend to give rise to
rather more extreme levels of "implicit" tariffs. For example, it is relatively
rare to find explicit tariffs that exceed 100 percent ad valorem in our countries.
However, it is more readily possible to find (even numerous) instances of im-
plicit tariffs in the 100 percent range or over.
A. Faked Invoicing
There seems to be fairly impressive evidence of underinvoiced imports in the
case of two countries, Turkey and the Philippines, that relates to tariffs.
Evidence for underinvoiced imports in response to tariffs and import
premiums under QRs is available for Turkey and Pakistan.
For Turkey, the tariff-related underinvoicing of imports was recorded by
Bhagwati, for 1960 and 1961, using the classic partner-country trade data com-
parison technique.8 Utilizing such comparisons for Turkey's trade with Italy,
Germany, the United States, France, and the Netherlands, and allowing for
possible statistical reasons for such discrepancies as were evident, he conclud-
ed that significant discrepancies were left, for which the only explanation ap-
peared to be underinvoicing of imports.9 The categories of goods that showed
perverse discrepancies also generally had tariff rates ranging up to 30 percent
and rarely below 10 percent, whereas the black market premium for foreign
exchange had rarely exceeded 15 percent according to official observations, so
that it seemed reasonable to conclude that the discrepancies represented
underinvoicing of imports by and large. This conclusion was further reinforced
by the fact that understatement of value in the field of manufac-
tures—especially machinery, which is frequently made to order and rarely car-
ries standard prices that the customs can readily check—is readily possible,
and it was precisely in these areas that the perverse discrepancies occurred in
the Turkish case.
Baldwin also records underinvoicing of Philippines imports, relying
however on aggregate data on imports (as distinct from Bhagwati's more
disaggregated examination of Turkish trade data to adjust for possible
misallocations of specific items among different sources of origin or SITC
categories). He cites Philippines' partner-country trade data, compiled by
George Hicks, for 1950-1958 and concludes that there was possible underin-
voicing of both exports and imports. Citing high tariffs and/or import con-
trols as the cause of underinvoiced imports, Baldwin argues that textiles were
possibly the best-known illustration of this phenomenon. Baldwin also con-
ducted a test of the hypothesis that the degree of import undervaluation isFAKED INVOICING AND SMUGGLING 69
positively related to the height of duty levied on an item. The 1967 f.o.b. (free-
on-board) import values from the Philippine Central Bank and f.o.b. export
values of the same items from the U.S. Department of Commerce for a sample
of sixty-two commodities were compared. The regression equation relating to
this comparison was as follows:
y1.65 + 14.70x
h
—U.S.data on U.S. exports to the Philippines w ere 3'
—Philippinedata on Philippine imports from the U.S.
and x1969 ad valorem tariff rates in the Philippines (in per-
cent)
The t-value on the coefficient of x was 4.27, which is significant at the 1 per-
cent level, and the coefficient of correlation was .48. Thus Baldwin concluded
that the hypothesis that the higher the tariff the greater the degree of under-
valuation was supported by the statistical analysis. Moreover, the degree of
undervaluation increased very sharply as the duty rose.'°
In regard to the effects of import premiums, as distinct from those of
tariffs, there is evidence in the country studies from Turkey and outside the
Project studies from Pakistan (as we shall presently discuss). Thus, for
Turkey, Anne Krueger cites a study by Cahid Kayra for the period 1963 to
1969, which undertook a detailed reconciliation of Turkish and partner-
country trade statistics, including adjustment for transport costs, differences
in the timing of imports, and other factors, and turned up substantial evidence
of underinvoicing of imports and shifted classifications in categories where
sizeable savings in import duties or gains in premiums were possible."
There is little such systematic evidence on faked invoicing in the other
country studies in the Project. A notable exception is the Chilean study where
some evidence on faked invoicing is available by a comparison of trade
statistics for operating partners; but the argument is not carried far enough to
make the evidence reasonably compelling.'2 The only other evidence on faked
invoicing in the Project is based on interviews. Thus, for India, Bhagwati and
Srinivasan record overinvoicing of several non-traditional exports carrying
high rates of import entitlements and high premiums thereon in turn, as with
art-silk fabrics. They also note that the elimination of these extreme incentives
with the June 1966 devaluation may have resulted in a seemingly less satisfac-
tory showing of export performance than was actually the case, merely
because the degree of overinvoicing had been seriously reduced.
Going outside the country studies, however, we can mention here the ex-
cellent analysis by Munir Sheikh of faked invoicing in Pakistan during
1965-1968." Using the partner-country comparison technique, Sheikh worked70 ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL
with thirty-six different commodities and with partner countries that supplied
over 80 percent of Pakistan's imports. He then divided the commodities into
two broad groups, "restricted" and "liberal," based on a careful examination
of the incidence of import licensing thereon. The results showed a very strong
tendency for commodities in the restricted category to have the Pakistani im-
port values fall significantly below the partner-country export values, in-
dicating underinvoicing of imports for each of the four years considered.
Sheikh further managed to establish a relationship between underinvoicing
and the classification of a commodity in a high-tariff category or a low-tariff
category. The former category meant that the goods therein were more prone
to underinvoicing.'4
Finally, for Ghana, we also have a careful analysis by David Scheffman
of trade data discrepancies in Ghanaian cocoa trade, suggesting underinvoic-
ing of exports in this instance.t5 Choosing S.I.T.C. classification 072-100
(cocoa beans, raw or roasted), which constitutes the major portion of the
Ghanaian cocoa exports, and considering 1964-1969, Scheffman shows that
substantial underinvoicing of cocoa exports is apparent with Canada, Norway,
and the United Kingdom.
B. Smuggling
The detection of smuggling has also exercized the ingenuity of economists. An
obvious approach is to infer the volume of smuggling from the data on con-
fiscations. This is however problematic unless one knows the expected risk of
confiscation with which smugglers are working. Much of the evidence on
smuggling is therefore impressionistic. Thus, Anne Krueger notes for Turkey
that she herself encountered "an incredible variety" of imported goods not
eligible for importation on the shelves of local groceries and in the windows of
various shops and that smuggling was sufficiently widespread so that its ex-
istence was officially acknowledged at the end of the First Five Year Plan.6
Similarly, Baldwin, records an estimate of smuggling into Philippines as
follows: 17
Anestimate from the government's Anti-Smuggling Action Center places the an-
nual value of smuggled cigarettes at about $37 million in the 1962-65 period and
$9 million from 1966 to 1968. Although estimates of the influx of other smuggled
goods are not available, the Anti-Smuggling Action Center does report the value
of confiscations of these other goods. If the ratio of the total volume of cigarettes
smuggled to the volume of cigarettes confiscated holds for these other goods, the
total value of smuggled goods, including cigarettes, comes to about $19 million in
both 1966 and 1969, or around 2 percent of total imports.CAPITAL FLIGHT 71
Finally, it is worth recording here a technique, used independently by
Timothy King for Mexico and by Richard Cooper for Indonesia, to detect
smuggling. It works for tariffs but not for QRs because it compares the tariff-
inclusive price of imported goods in domestic markets with the actual prices at
which they sell. Both King and Cooper, using this technique, were able to show
that smuggling had managed to drive the actual prices below the tariff-
inclusive prices and that this discrepancy tended to increase with the tariff
rate. 18
III.CAPITAL FLIGHT
The faked invoicing that we considered in the preceding section, as also smug-
gling for that matter, was regarded strictly from the viewpoint of the incentive
to undertake such illegal transactions without focusing on whether its effect
was to create a supply of or demand for illegal foreign exchange. The latter
question becomes relevant, however, when we try to detect capital flight. This
phenomenon represents a demand for illegal foreign exchange that is fed by
the supply created by phenomena such as "leaked" inward remittances and
capital flows and primarily by underinvoicing exports and overinvoicing im-
ports.
Note that the incentives to underinvoicing exports and overinvoicing im-
ports as a vehicle for capital flight are the opposite of those discussed in the
preceding section as leading to overinvoicing exports and underinvoicing im-
ports for tax or other benefits. Both sets of phenomena may exist side by side,
complicating the task of empirical verification.
A. A Statistical Analysis
One important impact of exchange control in LDCs is indeed that capital flight
would occur in illegal fashion.'9 Whether, of course, such flight is still below
the level that would occur in the absence of exchange control is an issue that is
difficult to settle empirically. We would be inclined to assume that the extra
costs of illegal methods of capital outflow tend to reduce its level. However, to
the extent that exchange controls may generate expectations of devaluation,
this may induce capital outflow as a hedge.
We decided therefore to explore the possibility of making partner-country
trade data comparison to see whether the phenomena of overinvoicing imports
and underinvoicing exports can be detected to infer such capital flight from the
LDCs. Note, of course, that the illegal outflow of foreign exchange, so
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financing partly the underinvoicing of imports (as detected for Turkey in the
preceding section) and related phenomena that require the illegal use of
foreign exchange. Also, the analysis leayes out of consideration possible
capital flight via smuggling.
We confined our analysis to comparisons of the trade data of LDCs with
the Organization for Economic Development and Co-operation (OECD)
countries, examining altogether twenty-eight LDCs for 1966. This, of course,
means that capital flight that occurs among LDCs would not be shown up,
even in principle, by our methods. There is "word-of-mouth" evidence of
such flight occurring from some of the African countries to India by the In-
dian settlers, and from Indonesia, Malaysia, and Philippines to Hong Kong
and Taiwan by the overseas Chinese communities.
Our method is subject to considerable "noise." There are a number of
purelystatisticalreasons why partner-countrydata may notmatch.
Nonetheless, it is interesting to see whether, on comparison, OECD imports
from each LDC are sufficiently above that LDC's exports to OECD countries
to indicate underinvoicing of that LDC's exports and consequent presumption
of capital flight. It is also interesting to see whether each LDC's imports from
OECD exceed the OECD exports to that LDC by a sufficient amount to in-
dicate overinvoicing of imports and hence capital flight again from the LDC.
B. Analysis of Findings
Table 4-1 summarizes for each of the twenty-eight LDCs the percentage dif-
ference between imports and exports as a proportion of exports, the export
figures being those recorded by the LDCs and the import figures being those
recorded by the OECD countries. It is really quite remarkable that, in the
total OECD columns, we find that for all but two countries there is an excess
of import figures over the corresponding export figures. However, note that
the exports are f.o.b. and imports are generally c.i.f., so that the excess is ac-
tually smaller than it looks. But even if we estimate average insurance and
freight at a crude 10 percent on f.o.b. value, it would still leave twenty LDCs
as export-underinvoicers.
Noting that the United States and Canada record their imports by f.o.b.
values, we also calculated separately the trade flow from each LDC to the two
countries combined. Column 2 of Table 4-1 shows the discrepancy between the
combined imports of the United States and Canada and the corresponding ex-
ports by LDCs as a percentage of the import figures. The excess of import
figures over the corresponding export figures in this case would be presump-
tive evidence for export underinvoicing practices in LDCs. Of the twenty coun-
tries noted earlier, such positive excess shows up for all but one (Pakistan).CAPITAL FLIGHT 73
Table 4-1.Exports of LDCs to OECD Countries Compared with Corresponding
Imports by OECD Countries from LDCs, and Black Market Premium of U.S.
Dollars, for 28 LDCs: 1966
U.S.A. and
Total OECD Canada Black Market
Country 100(M —X)/X100 (M —X)/M Premium of US$ (%)
(by region) (1) (2) (3)
South A merica
Argentina 24.2 17.5 23
Brazila 14.0 4.1 10
Chile 4.5 4.4 49
Colombiaa 14.2 9.3 na.
Mexico 37.0 14.0 0
Central America
Costa Rica 6.8 6.6 17
El Salvador 0.1 —5.3 13
Guatemala 24.2 16.3 15
Honduras 27.3 3.8 0
Nicaragua 14.7 3.2 19
Africa
Ethiopiaa 14.6 15.1 24
Ivory Coast 26.9 19.2 na.
Libya 11.1 5.2 20
Nigeria 9.9 1.1 n.a.
Tunisia 47.2 34.7 67
Far East
Hong Kong 13.7 9.6 1
Korea —4.6 —16.7 0
Philippines 16.1 16.5 2
Taiwan 7.0 —2.1 3
Thailanda 6.4 3.6 0.6
South Asia and Mid East
ceyi0nb 20.1 12.9 94
Egypt 30.7 13.9 111
India 23.7 5.3 74
Iran 35.2 21.4 4
Pakistan 14.3 —3.5 75
Europe
Greece 27.9 16.1 4
Turkeya 15.4 9.6 40
Yugoslavia —1.0 —1.0 17
Notes:1. OECD countries in Tables 4-1 and 4-2 include only EFTA, EEC, USA, Canada and
Japan. 2. M, X represent imports and exports, respectively.
a1967data.
b1968data.
Sources: United Nations, Statistical Papers, Series D (Commodity Trade Statistics). OECD,
Statistics of Foreign Trade, Series C (Commodity Trade). Pick, Franz, Pick's Currency
Yearbook, Pick Publ. Co., N.Y. Also printed in J. Bhagwati, ed., Illegal Transactions op.
cit.; page 151.74 ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL
Moreover, the magnitudes of the discrepancies are quite significant. They are
larger than 10 percent in eleven cases, and between 5 to 10 percent in five
others. These sixteen countries may therefore be classified as "plausible"
export-underinvoicers.
We would further argue that, unlike the imports of LDCs that we shortly
analyze, a significant part of the export sector is usually free from very large
subsidies and taxes and the export duties on traditional exports are usually well
balanced by subsidies on non-traditional exports. Hence, no pronounced ef-
fect of trade tax and subsidy policies need be expected to affect the trade
declarations in the direction of either net overinvoicing or net underinvoicing
of exports.
We would thus presume that the above results strongly signify capital
flight from LDCs, especially in light of the supplementary evidence concerning
the black market premium of U.S. dollars in each LDC, averaging for the year
corresponding to the trade figure calculations, presented in the last column of
Table 4-1. In view of its "black" nature, the estimates of a premium on
foreign exchange presented here may not be very reliable. They nevertheless
substantiate our result quite well. Among the nineteen export-underinvoicers,
eleven show black market premiums exceeding 10 percent (some as high as 100
percent) and four others smaller but still positive premiums. In the cases of
Colombia, Nigeria, and the Ivory Coast, information on black markets is not
available.
A breakdown of the nineteen countries by the degree of underinvoicing of
exports to the United States and Canada and the height of black market
premiums, based on columns 2 and 3, can be shown as follows:
Black Market Premium (%)
TradeData
Discrepancy (%) >20 10-19 1-9 0 No Data
>10 5 1 3 1 1
5-10 3 1 1
1-4 2 1
Using the height of black market premium as an indication of the profit from
the illegal sales of foreign exchange in the black market,2° we may then deduce
that in more than half of the nineteen countries under consideration, the incen-
tives for export underinvoicing are quite clearly evident.
The data in Table 4-2, on the other hand, relate to LDC imports. We try
to see if the same conclusion can be drawn from these statistics, with overin-
voicing of imports being the instrument whereby capital flight occurs from
LDCs.CAPITAL FLIGHT 75
Table 4-2.Imports of LDCs from OECD Countries Compared with
Corresponding Exports by OECD Countries to LDCs for 28 LDCs: 1966
Percentageshare of
Country
100 -(Imports—Lxports)/Lxports SITC 5-8 in total
(by region) Total trade SITC 5-8 LDCs imports
South A merica
Argentina 0.6 —0.4 91.8
Brazila 1.3 —4.7 75.5
Chile 16.6 17.1 82.8
Colombia' 12.1 —12.1 68.8
MCXCOa —7.7 —4.4 85.7
Central America
Costa Rica 19.0 17.9 86.6
El Salvador 8.1 10.5 87.9
Guatemala —0.6 2.4 87.6
Honduras 14.5 17.8 89.2
Nicaragua 7.8 8.5 88.4
Africa
Ethiopiaa —1.2 —0.1 84.2
Ivory Coast 13.0 7.0 80.9
Libya —9.9 —10.9 83.4
Nigeria 14.9 15.2 85.4
Tunisia 0.1 1.4 75.2
Far East
Hong Kong —11.6 —11.4 84.1
Korea —0.4 —10.0 67.4
Philippines —7.6 —8.3 80.1
Taiwan —3.3 —3.4 75.4
Thailanda 14.0 11.0 88.5
South Asia and Mid East
Ceyionb —5.7 —11.0 71.2
Egypt 8.3 6.4 60.6
India —1.0 —15.7 55.0
Iran —1.3 0.8 90.7
Pakistan —1.3 —7.6 77.4
Europe
Greece —0.2 —0.2 81.7
TurkeyZ —13.4 —10.2 91.1
Yugoslavia —1.3 6.2 72.6
Notes and Sources: Same as Table 4-1.
We did not expect to see, on the LDC-import side, a clear demonstration
of capital flight for two reasons. First, the customs authorities are more
vigilant about faking of transactions on the import side than on the export side
because traditionally duties have been levied on a much wider range of imports
than of exports in LDCs. Hence the faking of import invoices is likely to be
confinedtoessentiallymanufactured(StandardInternationalTrade
Classification [SITCJ 5-8)importswhere product differentiation, and so on,76 ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL
make it generally possible to "get past the customs" with faked invoices. Sec-
ond, since imports are almost never subsidized at the customs point, there is
always a net tariff on imports into any country (resulting from the gross tariffs
which exist in practice) that acts ceteris paribus to reduce overinvoicing of im-
ports (for overinvoicing implies paying more tariff duty). Thus, depending on
the relationship of the tariff structure to the import structure (since the same
duty on different types of products can create different effects just because
different products are differently susceptible to the possibility of faking trade
declarations, as we have just argued), one may find the incentive to overin-
voice imports, to facilitate capital flight, overcome in various degrees and
result, in some cases, even in a net incentive to underinvoice imports.2'
Our expectation that the import side would show mixed results was borne
out in fact, as Table 4-2 shows. Altogether seven LDCs show a percentage ex-
cess of imports over exports, on exports, of over 10 percent for total trade,
with six more LDCs having a positive (but less than 10 percent) excess and fif-
teen LDCs having a negative excess figure. This would suggest, once we take
into account the fact that imports are c.i.f. and exports are f.o.b. value, that
seven LDCs with excess on top of 10 percent in Table 4-2 are clearly overin-
voicers whereas all the rest are not, while those having negative figures are
probably clearly underinvoicers. The same exercise, repeated for only SITC
categories 5-8, shows that these conclusions roughly carry over, except that on-
ly five LDCs became clearly overinvoicers: Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras,
Nigeria, and Thailand.22 If we could show that the average tariff level on SITC
group 5-8 in these five LDCs is lower than in the remaining LDCs in our sam-
ple, we would have a reasonable presumption that these five LDCs are ex-
periencing capital flight through overinvoicing whereas in the other LDCs, the
higher tariff level is tending to create a counter-incentive to underinvoice im-
ports. However, neat as this would be, a failure to find a lower average tariff
level in the five LDCs would still not rule out the presumption of capital flight
for two reasons: (1) as argued above, it is not the usual average tariff level that
is really relevant for our analysis but the tariffs weighted in such a way as to
reflect the "invoice-fakeability" of the importable commodities, and there is
really no feasible way in which this could be done with available information;
and (2) what matters in determining whether imports will be overinvoiced or
underinvoiced is not just the tariff level but also the premium on black market
foreign exchange.23 This premium is not uniform across the LDCs in our sam-
ple, as is evident in Table 4-1, column 3. Hence, we have little choice except to
infer from Table 4-2 merely that the phenomenon of overinvoicing of imports,
as a vehicle of capital flight, seems to be much more restricted than the
phenomenon of underinvoicing of exports. This asymmetry of conduit
behavior for capital flight in the exports and imports of LDCs is, on the other
hand, a conclusion of some interest to policy-makers in these countries.24CAPITAL FLIGHT 77
IV. REVERSE LINKS BETWEEN QRs AND ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS
Next, we should note that, while the trade and payments regime affected the
incidence of illegal transactions, the reverse link was also evident in some of
the countries in the Project. Three instances of interest should suffice to il-
lustrate this phenomenon.
First, some of the QR regimes (e.g., Chile, Colombia, and Turkey) ruled
out the importation of used goods because it was difficult to determine their
market price and hence any associated faking of invoices. Thus an obvious and
apparently advantageous segment of the world market was ruled out merely
because it may lend itself to abuse.
Second, since smuggling would be difficult to pin down if legally and il-
legally imported commodities were simultaneously entering the domestic
market, it was occasionally the practice in some of the countries in the Project
to shift such items as were "easy" to smuggle into "prohibited lists." If then
these items turned up in the market, they would have a very high probability of
having been smuggled and hence of being detected as such, thus deterring the
smuggling.
Third, the Colombian INCOMEX had an interesting argument on the
blend of tariffs and QRs to deter smuggling. Thus, Carlos Diaz-Alejandro
writes :25
Apartfrom the smuggling of spare parts and some consumer goods, such as
furs, perfumes, jewelry, and cigarettes, INCOMEX feels that the system is
relatively free of leaks and well organized, in the sense that importers know what
to expect. Its officials argue, not without reason, that the combination of
moderate tariffs plus import controls forms a more powerful barrier to smuggling
than a situation with higher tariffs and no import controls. A key element in their
reasoning is that, as more items are shifted from the prohibited list to the prior
license list, more uncertainty will be planted in the minds of would-be smugglers,
whose profit margins could be reduced or wiped out if INCOMEX suddenly per-
mits imports of moderately taxed goods.
This argument is not fully spelled out as given because it is theoretically possi-
ble to vary tariffs as one varies QRs. However, it acquires cogency in light of
the difficulty in varying tariffs as frequently as QRs did change in nearly all the
countries in the Project.
APPPENDIX V: NOTES ON THE WELFARE-THEORETIC
ANALYSIS OF ILLEGAL ACTIVITIES INDUCED BY
INTERFERENCES WITH THE FOREIGN TRADE REGIME
The text of this chapter has been confined to analyzing the empirical and
statistical aspects of illegal transactions induced by interferences with the78 ILLEGAL TRANSACTIONS AND EXCHANGE CONTROL
foreign trade regime. Almost nothing was said, however, about the welfare ef-
fects of these phenomena.
As it happens, a great deal of literature has recently grown up on this
precise theme. Bhagwati and Hansen initiated the analysis by modifying the
traditional 2 x 2 model of trade theory to include a foreign reciprocal de-
mand curve for illegal trade. In this model, the illegal trade transformation
possibility was less favorable than for legal trade, this feature being the
analytical device (earlier used by Paul Samuelson to deal with transport costs
in the 2 x 2 model) to reflect the incremental resource costs used up in under-
taking the illegal trade.26 Using essentially the same approach, Johnson as also
Bhagwati and Srinivasan later analyzed the relative rankings of optimal and
maximal revenue tariffs in the presence of smuggling.27
Sheikh made an important modification in the analysis to allow primary
factors to be used in producing an intermediate non-traded good that would be
used in fixed coefficients for undertaking illegal (but not legal) imports.28
While therefore the Bhagwati-Hansen-Johnson-Srinivasan technique of
building incremental social costs of illegal trade was in keeping with the 2 x 2
model's technique of subsuming such costs into the transformation function
itself (traditionally for legal and now also for illegal trade), the Sheikh model
was a step in the direction of modeling the primary factor costs of trade
directly—albeit, however, by the artificial device of the non-traded input into
illegal trade. Needless to say, as should be obvious to trade theorists, this dif-
ference in the production cum trade structure of the model led to certain dif-
ferences in the conclusions regarding the conditions under which illegal trade
may or may not improve welfare.29
Finally, attention has been focused recently on the possible asymmetries
between the welfare effects of QRs and tariffs in the presence of illegal trans-
actions. As already noted in Chapter 2 above, Falvey has extended the
Bhagwati-Hansen type of analysis to the case where QRs, rather than tariffs
are in place. The outcomes can be different because QRs provide an upper
limit to legal imports whereas tariffs do not.30
Of equal interest and potentially complementary to the theoretical
analysis of Bhagwati-Hansen is the forceful argument of Anne Krueger that
QRs, even when otherwise equivalent in the Bhagwati-sense to tariffs, have
one additional, asymmetrical effect, namely, that they lead to competitive
rent-seeking that uses up real resources and hence entails a greater loss of
welfare than a Bhagwati-equivalent tariff would.3' Whereas the Bhagwati-
Hansen-Johnson-Srinivasan-Sheikh type of illegal trade analysis focuses on
the welfare effects of trade restrictions, brought about by attempts of illegal
importers to profit from the discrepancy between foreign and domestic prices
that QRs and tariffs equally imply, Krueger's elegant analysis eschews this and
focuses instead on the notion that QRs, which carry premiums, attract the useNOTES 79
of resources in order to earn them. While this analysis of what are presumably
legal resource costs incurred in securing import premiums—though illegal ac-
tivity such as bribing, as noted in Section I of this chapter, may attend also on
competitive rent-seeking—would appear endemic to QRs, it would appear that
a complete comparison of tariffs and QRs should, in this case, include also the
"revenue-seeking" that would follow from the tariff revenues earned instead
in the case where tariffs are used. Needless to say, the real resource costs of
revenue-seeking (by lobbies seeking preferential allocation of tariff revenues
for their own benefit) may be less than the real resource costs of rent-seeking in
the QR case. But then, the asymmetry arises from the possible differences in
the nature of these "quasi-economic" activities in the two cases rather than
from the fact that only QRs, and not tariffs, attract such activities.
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